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BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
BEN F. SMALL JR.*
The material on Business Organization is intended to
deal with the more consequential aspects of the new devel-
opments in the fields of Agency, Partnership, and Corporation
law in Indiana. No specific attempt has been made to break
these fields down into all their constituent parts, but only
to present the general outlines of each as found in the ju-
dicial decisions, the legislation, and the opinions of the At-
torney General for the past five years.
AGENCY
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION
It is realized that there is a technical distinction be-
tween the principal and agent relation and the relation of
master and servant. However, that distinction does not fig-
ure in the materials presented here. Therefore, the term
"employment relation" will be used to cover both.
Creation of the Relation; Sub-agent.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Soderling,' it was held that an
attendant employed by the operator of a filling station owned
by the defendant oil company became the servant of a truck-
ing company when he undertook to help unload merchandise
brought there by the carrier. Thus, when he negligently
caused an air compressor to fall on an employee of the truck-
ing company, his negligence could not be imputed to the de-
fendant oil company. The consignee of the merchandise was
the lessee and operator of the filling station property, and
he had ordered the attendant to help with the unloading, not
staying to see how it was done.
The tariff schedule under which the compressor was
shipped required the consignee either to furnish a man to
help with the unloading or to pay at a rate of one dollar an
hour per man if the carrier furnished the additional man-
power. The court held that this may have vested in the
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University Law School, Evening
Division.
1. 112 Ind. App. 437, 42 N. E. (2d) 373 (1942).
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consignee the authority to help unload the compressor, but
gave him no authority to appoint another as sub-agent. Since
that was true, the court reasons that the attendant, rather
than acting for the oil company, was acting exclusively for
the carrier. For substantiation, the court pointed to the
lease between the operator lessee (consignee) and the lessor
oil company, providing that the lessee had no authority to
appoint agents to act for the lessor, and that no one perform-
ing services on the premises at the request of the lessee
should be deemed to be an employee of the lessor.
If this provision be upheld, then the result reached by
the court would seem justified, although the oil company
probably never objected to looking upon the attendant as
its employee when accepting the monetary benefits and other
fruits of his labor. Had the case been one of injury to a
third person by reason of the third person's reliance on the
attendant's being a servant of the oil company, then liability
might be founded on an estoppel, but in the instant case the
injury probably did not result from any particular reliance
on the part of the carrier. The injured man would as read-
ily have accepted the aid of a stranger. Although the rea-
soning in the case may cause some uneasiness, the end result
is probably just if the suit was merely an attempt to relin-
quish the comparatively slight workmen's compensation award
which presumably would be due, in favor of a greater re-
covery at law against the 'master" of the person at fault.2
An interesting question of principal and agent from a
taxation standpoint is presented in Gross Income Tax Divi-
sion v. Indianapolis Brewing Co.3 Manufacturers of beer in
Indiana, being compelled under a federal statute4 to pay a
federal tax on beer sold, had adopted the practice of adding
the amount of said tax to the sale price of the beer. This,
they contended, made them agents of the United States gov-
ernment within the meaning of the Indiana Gross Income
Tax Act of 1933, 5 which contains an exemption clause for
"taxes . . . collected as agent for the state of Indiana and/
or the United States of America."6 The court, citing 7 the
2. The case is discussed in 149 A.L.R. 644 (1944).
3. 108 Ind. App. 259, 25 N.E. (2d) 653 (1940).
4. 26 U.S.C.A. §3150 (1940).
5. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-2601 et seq.
6. Id. at §64-2606 (b).
7. At 265, 25 N.E. (2d) 653, 655.
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Restatement on Agency, defines an agent as " . . one
who, by the authority of another, undertakes to transact
some business or manage some affairs on account of such
other, and to render an account of it."8 The court might
well have excluded the contention of agency in the case by
simply quoting from the remainder of the section of the
state act in question reading, "No person shall be considered
an agent for the state of Indiana and/ or the United States
of America . . unless he has been explicitly designated
as a collecting agent in the statute under the terms of which
the tax is imposed." 9
However, on more devious grounds, the court answered
the contention by construing the federal tax to be an excise
on the privilege of manufacturing and selling beer, or in
other words, a provision "for the collection of such tax from
the appellees, instead of constituting appellees . . . as
agents for the collection of the tax from others." 10  Thus,
the exemption could not be made to apply in favor of one
who was a self-appointed "agent" to collect the federal tax
from himself under penalty for failure to do so. This same
point was disposed of in the same manner in Department of
Treasury v. Midwest Liquor Dealers."
Scope of the Relation; Family Car Doctrine.
Bryan v. Pommert12 has probably been discussed else-
where, but it may be well to bring out the agency aspect of
the case here. The wife of a car owner had a collision with
another automobile, and although the owner of the car driven
by the woman was not in the car at the time and thus had
nothing to do with its negligent operation, the injured plain-
tiff sued the husband, or owner. The suit was not brought
on the family purpose doctrine, but under the theory that
an actual principal-agent relation existed between the hus-
band and wife so far as the trip in question was concerned.
8. §1 of the Restatement defines agency as " . . . the relation-
ship which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and sub-ject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."
9. Ind. Stat. Ann., loc. cit. supra note 6.
10. At 266, 25 N.E. (2d) 653, 655.
11. 113 Ind. App. 569, 48 N.E. (2d) 71 (1943), where the argument
was that the dealers were agents of the state for the collection
of a stamp tax.
12. 110 Ind. App. 61, 37 N.E. (2d) 720 (1941).
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The court, in granting a new trial, indicated that in order
to establish liability on the husband, either actual control on
his part, or the right to control 13 the wife's activities would
have to be found, and the fact that the wife's trip was for
the purpose of buying clothes for a member of the family,
and also to bring back some goods with which to stock the
husband's store did not necessarily make her the agent of
her husband. This was said to be true even though the hus-
band accepted the fruits of the trip. The court was unwill-
ing to consider this a ratification of the wife's acts since it
found that the wife was performing the acts in question on
her own account at the time.
Since the wife's venture could be said to be for a family
purpose without the undue stretch of the imagination so often
found in such cases, it seems that an application of the fam-
ily purpose doctrine of vicarious liability in the instant case
would be most timely. However, it will be recalled that the
Indiana courts have never looked upon that doctrine favor-
ably.1 4 Thus we find the Appellate Court still requiring a
showing of actual principal and agent relationship and say-
ing that the absence of active control or the right to such
control defeats the agency contended for. Moreover, the
court distinguishes between services rendered by a wife as
part of her household duties and those rendered in other
capacities. 5
Respondeat Superior.
In Railway Express Agency v. Bonnell, 6 a general agent
for an express company, in the course of the business of his
principal, was called upon to visit a customer in regard to
lost merchandise. Although a number of company trucks
were available for his use, he accepted a ride in a privately
owned car driven by the night foreman, who was then off
duty and preparing to leave the office. Due to the negli-
gence of the driver, the plaintiff was injured and sued the
express company, contending that since the general agent
13. The same test was used in Van Drake v. Thomas, 110 Ind. App.
586, 38 N.E. (2d) 878 (1942), where the court said that it was
unnecessary that the master's control be in fact exercised so
long as the mere right to exercise it existed.
14. Harper, Law of Torts (1933) 620.
15. For a discussion of the entire problem, see id. at §283.
16. 218 Ind. 607, 33 N.E. (2d) 980 (1941).
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was acting within the scope of his authority, the principal
should be liable. The court rejected this argument, quoting1 7
Mr. Justice Park in 1827 English case 
:18
"I cannot bring myself to the length of supposing, that if
a man sends his servant on an errand, without providing
him with a horse, and he meets a friend who has one, who per-
mits him to ride, and an injury happens in consequence, the
master is responsible for that act. If it were so, every master
might be ruined by acts done by his servant without his know-
ledge or authority."
The court then added that where the master or principal
(the express company here) had no right to command or
forbid the act or omission resulting in the injury, no liability
should accrue.19
Since the general agent was without doubt acting within
the scope of his employment, liability might have been im-
puted to the principal if the general agent had in any way
controlled or attempted to control the foreman's operation
of the vehicle. In such event, the foreman, who by virtue
of the time clock, had become a stranger to the principal,
might have been converted into a sub-agent, thus forming
the chain of liability linking the principal. However, since
the foreman was off duty, since the car was not one regu-
larly used in the business, and since the foreman was subject-
ed to no attempted exercise of control, the general agent was
no more than a gratuitous guest in the vehicle of a friend.
The decision is perhaps strengthened by the fact that the
foreman intended to accomplish an errand of his own in ad-
dition to transporting the general agent to his destination.
Thus he had a motive of his own for the trip, aside from
whatever desire he may have had to befriend his superior.
This additional motive is important, although not always
controlling, as shown in Great American Tea Co. v. Van
Buren,20 where the court said2' "An act may be within the
scope of the employment although done in part to serve the
purpose of the servant." This, thought the court, was true
even though the predominant motive may have been self-
17. At 610, 33 N.E. (2d) 980, 981.
18. Goodman v. Kennell, 3 Car. & P. 167 (1827).
19. This passage was cited with approval in Bryan v. Pommert,
cited supra note 12.
20. 218 Ind. 462, 33 N.E. (2d) 580 (1941).
21. Id. at 467, 33 N.E. (2d) 580, 581.
2591946]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
service. The servant in that case, a truck driver, had been
relieyed of his route, but his employer had acquiesced in his
keeping the truck and continuing his work, at least in part.
When the accident occurred, the servant had finished his
deliveries and was in the course of seeing about other em-
ployment before bringing the truck home. In spite of this,
the court thought his deviation for personal reasons not
great enough to take him out of the course of his employ-
ment. It seems difficult to reconcile the somewhat elastic
reasoning of this case with the doctrinal rigidity of the Bon-
nell case supra, although the two are certainly distinguishable
on their facts.
Assault and Battery.
The ever-growing conception of apparent authority in
the agency field has not yet reached in Indiana the extent
of including assaults and batteries perpetrated in the course
of carrying out other authorized activities. In Moskins
Stores v. DeHart,22 an employe of a credit clothing corpora-
tion was employed to collect the corporation's accounts. In
the course of that duty the agent became over-zealous and
committed an assault and battery on one of the debtors. The
court found no liability on the part of the corporate prin-
cipal, saying that the agent's act could not be imputed unless
the use of force was contemplated, or was the usual conduct
in the particular kind of business involved, or unless the
employer had knowledge, either actual or constructive, that
the collector was the sort of person likely to resort to force
in the collection of accounts.
The case seems well reasoned and allays all fear that
the increasing trend of liberality shown in some jurisdictions
might come to prevail in Indiana. The opposing theory finds
its strength in a group of cases headed by the 1925 Son v.
Hartford Ice Cream Co. holding by the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors.23  The facts were very similar to those
in the Indiana case. The agent, in attempting a collection
for ice cream delivered, tried forcibly to take a cash register
since he could get payment in no other way. In the ensuing
struggle, he committed a series of batteries on the proprietor.
22. 217 Ind. 622, 29 N.E. (2d) 948 (1940).
23. 102 Conn. 696, 129 AtI. 778 (1925), Steffen, Cases on Agency
(1933) 211.
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In holding the principal liable, the court pointed to the agent's
broad authority to deliver ice cream and collect for it, and
added that since the batteries were committed in the course
of carrying out that authority, the responsibility should fall
upon the principal.24 However, this case and others following
it are probably still very much in the minority, so the In-
diana holding is in accord with the rule generally applied
in other states.25
The Indiana rule as set out in the Moskins case was
qualified somewhat in the later case of Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Paddock.26  In that case, the office manager of
one of the defendant's stores forcibly ejected a customer from
the store premises following a dispute over a bill. The court
there held the principal liable, distinguishing the situation
from that found in the Moskins case by saying that an of-
fice manager of a store is usually given the authority to
properly eject persons from the premises, whereas a collector
of accounts, as in the Moskins case has no authority given
him to use force in his collection of accounts. Thus, the
Goodyear case falls within the exception announced by the
court in the Moskins case to the effect that "it is necessary to
show that the use of force was contemplated . . . in the
conduct of the master's business .. ,,2 It is reasonable
to suppose that the use of force would be contemplated on
the part of an office manager in proper cases. Moreover,
an office manager has more apparent authority generally
than a mere collection agent. Thus the distinction seems
well founded.
Another assault and battery case, somewhat analogous
to the Moskins case is Wells v. Northern Indiana Public Serv-
ice Co.28 A meter reader for a public service company, in
preparing to read a gas meter, struck at a dog with his flash-
light, but instead, hit the plaintiff. Quoting the Restatement
24. " . . . the truck driver's attempt to collect out of the plaintiff's
cash register precipitated a series of acts constituting one con-
tinuous transaction, and the beating occurred in the course of
the servant's attempt to perform the business of the master."
129 Atl. 778, 780.
25. The court, in support of its holding of non-liability cites 2 Mechem,
Agency (2d ed. 1914) §1978, and 1 Restatement, Agency (1933)
§245.
26. 219 Ind. 672, 40 N.E. (2d) 697 (1942),
27. 217 Ind. 622, 627, 29 N.E. (2d) 948, 949.
28. 111 Ind. App. 166, 40 N.E. (2d) 1012 (1942).
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on Agency,29 the court said"0 "An act of a servant is not
within the scope of employment if it is done with no inten-
tion to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on
account of which he is employed." The court found that the
employee was not, in striking at the dog, engaged in his
regular course of meter reading, or acting in self defense,
but was only giving vent to his personal distaste for dogs;
hence he was acting outside the scope of his employment.
This case further allays fear of encroachments of such cases
as the Hartford Ice Cream Co. pronouncement supra.
An even simpler assault and battery case is found in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fogle,31 where a store clerk was
held to be acting within the scope of his employment in fol-
lowing a woman from the store, forcibly detaining her, and
searching violently through her belongings. The clerk had
been given express actual authority to follow persons seen
in the act of shoplifting, and once outside the store, to for-
cibly take the stolen goods from them. Thus it was easy
for the court to conclude that this was a sufficient basis for
inferring that the clerk was expected to act in the manner he
did when he suspected someone of shoplifting; therefore, he
was acting for his master in committing the assault, battery,
and false arrest. The case thus falls well within the rule of
the Moskins case and the Goodyear case, supra.
Vice-Principal.
In McKinnon v. Parrill,32 the plaintiff, a farm employee,
sustained injuries to his hand as a result of the negligence
of the husband of the owner of the farm in failing to turn
off a power corn picker while the plaintiff was cleaning it.
Since the employment did not fall within the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 33 the defense of the fellow-servant rule
was urged. The farm owner's husband was doubtlessly a
fellow-servant in the sense that he was working in the field
with the plaintiff, but that did not preclude his having higher
status. He was the active manager of the farm, supervised
29. §235.
30. At 168, 40 N.E. (2d)i 1012, 1013.
31. 221 Ind. 597, 50 N.E. (2d) 871 (1943).
32. 111 Ind. App. 343, 38 N.E. (2d) 1008 (1942).
33. A claim for compensation was made however, before suit at law
was begun. The court held such filing of claim not to be an
election of remedies since no Workmen's Compensation remedy
existed for election.
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all work on it, had full authority to engage and discharge
employees, and handled all business matters relative to the
farm. Therefore, the court pronounced him a vice-principal
and found that in directing the plaintiff's activity, he stood
in the same position as the ultimate principal, thus imputing
his negligence to that principal.
The use of the vice-principal doctrine here seems logical
since the husband was in a very real sense the general man-
ager of the farm. The court pointed out that one person
may at different times he both a vice-principal and a fellow-
servant, depending upon whether he is directing the work
of his employees as a foreman, or whether he is .working
with them on a common project. Here, the husband was
certainly acting in his capacity as an overseer and manager
in ordering the plaintiff to clean the corn picker. Although
the opinion raises the point incidentally, 4 more weight might
have been given to the theory that the mechanical corn picker,
when in operation, was an inherently dangerous instrumen-
tality, imposing upon the principal a non-delegable duty to
see that proper instructions for safety were given to those
who were to work with it.
"Enttre" Contracts; Bonus.
In Montgomery Ward v. Gusgnet,35 the plaintiff employee
was discharged from his position as store manager for the
defendant two months before his annual bonus was to fall
due. There is among different jurisdictions a considerable
division of authority as to whether a bonus at the end of a
certain period calls for service during the entire period as
a condition precedent to payment, or whether it is merely a
deferred payment plan for compensation accrued. One group
of courts consider the bonus as a reward, a bait, so to speak,
to induce faithful service for the tne specified, while the
other group considers it merely as a wage device. Thus the
latter group gives the employee that part of the bonus which
is proportionate to the length of time worked. The court
in the Montgomery Ward case shows disfavor toward the
latter theory, holding that such a rule should not prevail
unless the employee was discharged without cause. However,
the problem in the instant case is governed by the contract
34. At 356, 38 N.E. (2d) 1008, 1013.
35. 112 Ind. App. 661, 45 N.E. (2d) 387 (1942).
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into which the parties entered, which included a provision
that the entire bonus would be forfeited in case of termina-
tion of services by either the employer or the employee, and
gave the employer the right to discharge without cause. This
was held to be controlling.
Tenure; "Permanent Employment."
The term "permanent employment" has also given rise
to many conflicting decisions. In other jurisdictions it has
been held to mean (1) employment for so long as the same
type of work is available ;3 (2) employment for life;37 and
(3) employment at will.ss The plaintiff in the Montgomery
Ward case, supra contended that he was entitled to "perma-
nent employment" although his written contract with the
defendant made no mention of it. There was evidence indi-
cating that one of defendant's representatives told the plain-
tiff, before the employer-employee relation was established,
that the course of training for a store manager's position
would take five years, and that the company would not under-
take a five-year training period if it did not think the em-
ployment following it was to be permanent.
In the cases holding contracts for permanent employ-
ment to be more than contracts at will, it is usual to find
some consideration given for that employment other than
mere services.39 Even if it be assumed that in the instant
case the vague language of defendant's representative amount-
ed to a promise, there was certainly no separate considera-
tion given for it. Moreover, since the negotiations were all
oral, there could not be any contract, even for the five-year
training period because of the statute of frauds.4° Thus the
written contract later entered into by the parties was the
only instrument in question, and since it fixed no tenure,
the court held the relationship to be one at will.
36. Cornig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46 N.E. 117 (1897).
37. Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R. Co., 173 U.S. 1 (1899).
38. Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 164 N.E.
342 (1928).
39. In Carnig v. Carr, cited supra note 36, the employee gave up his
business, in which he had been in competition with his new em-
ployer. In Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R. Co., cited supra
note 37, the employee had been injured, and gave his employer
a release in consideration for the new contract.
40. An oral "agreement that is not to be performed within one year
from the making thereof." Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §33-101.
264 [Vol 21
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PARTNERSHIP
FORMATION OF ORGANIZATION
The 1937 Indiana Unemployment Compensation Law,41
designed to relieve those who have for a time enjoyed a
service relationship followed by a period of unemployment,
automatically excludes those who are their own employers,
such as members of a conventional type partnership. This
does not mean however, that the Act can be circumvented
by the organization of what appears to be a partnership,
and yet has none of its substantial attributes.
In In re ZeitS,42 four lessees of industrial property drew
up what purported to be a partnership agreement, naming
themselves as senior partners, and all workers in the plant
as junior partners. Group meetings were held, at which
times the terms of the agreement were explained to the
workers, then each was asked to sign as a "junior partner."
It was made known to them that a refusal to sign the agree-
ment meant that there would he no more work available
to those refusing. As a result, the agreement was signed by
114 workers. Under this agreement all junior partners who
worked a minimum of 600 hours during any one year were
to receive a ten percent share of the net profits of the busi-
ness based on "units of interest," such units representing
hours of work on the part of the various employees. Any
junior partner could be expelled from the organization, or
could voluntarily resign therefrom, but in no case could he
be entitled to any share in the distribution of assets upon
the liquidation of the partnership, except as to the ten per-
cent share already mentioned. No investment of capital was
demanded of or made by any junior partner, and all hours
of work were rewarded by a fixed hourly rate of compensa-
tion; thus, there was no sharing of profits except as to the
ten percent shares based on the so-called units of interest.
The superintendent was given the authority to assign any
and all of the junior partners to their respective positions,
supervise their work, and fix their hourly rate wages. Aside
from the added dignity of being a "partner" there was no
evidence that under the partnership articles, the status and
41. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) §52-1501 et seq.
42. 108 Ind. App. 617, 31 N.E. (2d) 209 (1941).
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duties of a junior partner were any different from what
they were before the agreement was entered into.43
In the definitions section of the Act,4 4 "employment" is
defined as " . . . service . . . performed for remunera-
tion, or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express
or implied." Several exceptions are enumerated,45 but the
"junior partners" seemed not to fall within any of them.
The court defined a genuine partnership as "a voluntary
contract of association for the purpose of sharing the profits
as such, which may arise from the use of labor and skill
in a common enterprise; and an intention of the parties to
form a partnership for that purpose.14 6  Under this, as
well as any other accepted definition of partnership,47 it is
apparent that none of the elements of a partnership existed
as to the 114 junior partners. The court said,48 "any con-
tract for the performance of service will be scrutinized beyond
the mere form for the purpose of determining whether the
relationship of the parties involved falls within the provisions
of the Act." After such a scrutiny "beyond the mere form,"
the court concluded that while the organization might be a
partnership as among the four originators of the plan, the
agreement contained nothing to preclude the "junior part-
ners," who were in reality no more than ordinary employees,
from the benefits of the Unemployment Compensation Act.
The court also held that persons who share in the gross
receipts are not necessarily partners. 49 This is in accord
with the general rule that while such sharing is a weighty
43. A later amendment was made to the agreement, but it did not
enlarge the rights of the junior partners.
44. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) §52-1502. See particularly,
subsection (d) (1).
45. The act does not apply to one who is free from control or direc-
tion in the performance of his duties. Id. at §52-1502 (e) (5)(A). Neither does it apply to one who is either an independent
contractor or an agent receiving his remuneration solely on a
commission basis, and who is the master of his own time and
effort. Id. at §52-1502 (e) (5) (B).
46. At 636, 31 N.E. (2d) 209, 216.
47. The definition used in the Uniform Partnership Act, accepted in
twenty-four jurisdictions, is as follows: "A partnership is an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners abusiness for profit." 7 Uniform Laws Ann.; Partnership (1922)§6 (1).
48. At 632, 31 N.E. (2d) 209, 215.
49. At 639, 31 N.E. (2d) 209, 217.
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factor for consideration, it is not conclusive. ° In the mat-
ter of profit sharing, the instant case is somewhat analogous
to the leading English case of Wilkinson v. Frasier," where
fractional shares of the gross product of whaling and fishing
ventures were divided among the members of the ship's crew
at the end of each voyage. Since this took the form of de-
ferred payment of wages under a fluctuating scale, the court
held the relationship to be that of master and servant rather
than one of partnership. The instant case is even simpler since
wages were paid as they accrued, except for the ten percent
additional pay. It seems unlikely that any definition of part-
nership could be stretched to include the arrangement under
which the 114 workers in the Zeits case were employed.
Shortly after the Appellate Court's decision, two of the
employees of the partnership asked the state Supreme Court
for a declaratory judgment to the effect that the organiza-
tion was in fact a partnership as to all concerned, or if not,
that the compensation statute be declared unconstitutional.
The court ordered the complaint dismissed because the state
had not been named as a party and for want of jurisdiction
to enter a declaratory judgment.52
As to coverage of the Act, another problem was raised
in Royal Academy of Beauty Culture v. Review Board,53
where a corporation engaged in operating a beauty school
permitted students to work at the school in return for a
credit against their tuition. The court held this credit to
fall within the statutory definition of "remuneration," and
held the school to be an "employer" so as to entitle the stu-
dents to compensation.
Estoppel.
A question of the creation of a partnership by.. estoppel
is raised in Kerestury v. Elkhart Packing Co.54  A mother,
who operated a store with her son for a short time after the
50. See Crane, Law of Partnership (1938) 51-66, as to different kinds
of profit sharing plans and the effects given to them. See par-
ticularly §16 on profit sharing as wages to an employee.
51. 4 Esp. 182 (1803).
52. Thompson v. Travis, 221 Ind. 117, 64 N.E. (2d) 598 (1943). For
a discussion of the case in its context with other problems of
declaratory judgments, see Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in
Indiana (1944) 19 Ind. L. J. 175, 178.
53. 110 Ind. App. 246, 38 N.E. (2d) 872 (1942).
54. 108 Ind. App. 148, 27 N.E. (2d) 383 (1940).
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death of the father, surrendered possession of the store to
the son, who continued to operate it alone. No instrument
in writing showing the change of possession was executed,
and no notice of the change was given to persons who had
previously dealt with the father, the former proprietor. Al-
though the retiring mother took no active interest in the
business and received no income therefrom, she often visited
the store and was seen there from time to time by customers
and suppliers. Despite this, the Appellate Court found no
liability against the mother as a partner for the debts of the
business.
Certainly there was no partnership by express agree-
ment, no partnership inter se. Therefore, the only problem
for the court was to decide the case on the presence or ab-
sence of acts sufficient to constitute an estoppel. The court
reiterated the Common Law definition of estoppel:"" (1) a
representation or concealment of facts; (2) with knowledge
of the facts; (3) to one who was ignorant of the facts; (4)
with the intention that the representation be acted upon; and
(5) reasonable reliance by the one acting. Then the court
found elements (1), (4), and (5) to be lacking. Such find-
ing was based on the fact that the business had always been,
and was still being carried on in the father's name. It was
not definitely known by creditors that the mother had ever
held a partner's interest in the business, and so there was no
reason for anyone to rely on a supposed continuation of that
interest. The period during which she operated the store
with her son was only two months, not long enough for a
presumption of partnership to be formed in anyone's mind.
There was no evidence of fraud anywhere in the dealings,
so there was no basis for finding a partnership by estoppel.
A similar question was raised in Weber v. Fohl.56 A
father and his son operated mills in different towns in In-
diana, both under the name "Weber Milling Company." Up-
on the son's failure to pay for wheat shipped to him under
contract, the plaintiff shipper sued the father as a partner.
Again there was no partnership inter se, so the basis of the
contention was an alleged estoppel. Although there was evi-
dence that a very close business relationship did in fact exist
55. Id. at 153, 27 N.E. (2d) 383, 385.
56. 111 Ind. App. 388, 41 N.E. (2d) 648 (1942).
[Vol. 21
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
between the father and son, 57 it was apparent that the plain-
tiff was not fully aware of it at the time of contracting. The
relationship might have been misleading to some, but it was
held not to be so in the plaintiff's case. Furthermore, in
spite of the close relation between the two, there had never
been any attempt by either the father or the son to represent
themselves as partners. Therefore, under the definition of
estoppel used in the Kerestury case, supra, cited with approval
by the court, there was again no partnership by estoppel.
The weightiest contention of the plaintiff was that the
father had once said, "We could use lots of wheat at the
mill in Sunman." The court held this insufficient to amount
to a representation, and added 8 that such a statement might
"support . . a reasonable inference that a partnership
existed . . " but that "partnership by inference" in In-
diana had never existed. An examination of one of the cases
cited by the court as expressly so holding'5 shows that in
Indiana a very sharp distinction has been made between
partnership by estoppel and partnership by inference. The
distinction goes back to Lord Coke's statement that "every
estoppel . . .must be certain to every intent, and not to
be taken by argument or inference. 6 0  If this be true, then
the court is quite right in saying that there can be no estoppel
by inference, therefore, no partnership by inference. Query;
when does an inference become strong enough to be convert-
ed into a representation sufficient to fulfill the prerequisite
of estoppel?
CORPORATIONS
FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION
De Jure Existence.
Under the Domestic Corporations Act,61 a corporation
de lure comes into being when the certificate of incorpora-
tion has been issued by the Secretary of State. Then as a
condition precedent to doing business, certain other things are
57. Each checked on the other's bank account, the son had previously
worked in the father's mill, and the father owned the mill operated
by the son under a lease.
58. At 397, 41 N.E. (2d) 648, 652.
59. Wilkerson v. Wood, 81 Ind. App. 248, 143 N.E. 166 (1924).
60. Coke, Littleton 352b.
61. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §25-218.
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required, and in case of failure to comply, the statute imposes
personal liability on the officers and directors.62  In West-
ern Machine Works v. Edwards Corp.,63 it was held that where
these requirements were not met before the corporation
started doing business, the state could challenge such action,
but that a private individual had no such right since the
corporation had attained de jure status. The conditions to
doing business were held to be merely conditions subsequent
to organization, so that organization was complete even
though those conditions were not complied with.
RIGHTS OF STOCKHOLDERS
Declaration of Dividends.
There seems little doubt in Indiana that the propriety
of declaring dividends on corporate stocks rests within the
discretion of the directors, and further, that the courts should
not interfere with the proper and legitimate exercise of that
discretion.64 However, courts of equity will interfere to or-
der dividends paid out of surplus when the directors have
refused to do so without justification or in bad faith. There-
fore, it is not surprising to find the Appellate Court holding
in O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall,65 that it was proper for the lower
court to order payment of dividends accrued on cumulative
preferred stock in a corporation completely dominated by its
president, who made of the board of directors a mere figure-
head body. As evidence of bad faith, the court pointed to
this domination, the fact that the board did not meet except
for organization purposes, and the fact that the president,
who owned all the common stock in the corporation, had at-
tempted to purchase the plaintiff's cumulative preferred stock
with corporate assets. Therefore, the court affirmed the
lower court's order to pay the accrued dividends plus interest,
although refusing the claim for future dividends since that
62. Id. at §25-219. The requirements are that (1) a copy of the
articles, bearing the indorsement of the Secretary of State, must
be filed in the recorder's office of the county in which the prin-
cipal office is located; (2) the amount of paid-in capital pro-
vided for in the articles must have been paid in; and (3) an
affidavit of a majority of the board of directors must be filed in
the recorder's office of the county of the principal office, stating
that said paid-in capital has been paid in.
63. - Ind. - , 63 N.E. (2d) 535 (1945).
64. Star Pub. Co. v. Ball, 192 Ind. 158, 134 N.E. 285 (1922).
65. 108 Ind. App. 116, 25 N.E. (2d) 656 (1940).
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again would be a matter within the discretion of the directors,
and not to be probed into by the courts until a clear abuse
be shown. Since the corporation was entirely within the
control of the president, the court found it unnecessary that
the other directors be joined as parties defendant in the suit.
Whether the "rule of legitimate discretion" has identical
application to both preferred and common stock is somewhat
obscure in Indiana, no cases having been found in which
the decision rests solely on that ground, apart from differing
degrees of discretionary abuses on the part of the directors.
To apply the rule equally to both classes of stockholders
might allow a corporation to indefinitely postpone payment
of dividends in an honest policy of expansion working to
the benefit of the common stockholders and to the prejudice
of those holding preferred stock. Therefore, it has been
suggested 6 that the rule should be given a dual application
in order to more adequately protect the rights of the pre-
ferred stockholders who, as such, ought to be entitled to
more security. This problem of the rights of holders of
different classes of stock, as well as other aspects of the
problem has been discussed elsewhere.67
Suits to Have Dividends Declared; Form of the Action.
It should be borne in mind that even though there is
an apparent right to a declaration of dividends, one must
be diligent in selecting the course of procedure toward get-
ting them. In Rubens v. Marion-Washington Realty Corp.,68
all the circumstances required in the preferred stock certifi-
cates to justfy payment of dividends were present, and there
appeared to be some evidence of abused discretion on the
part of the directors. The court admitted the probability
that the complaint alleged a prime facie duty on the part of
the corporation to declare and pay dividends, and also ad-
mitted "the probability of a right to a mandatory injunction
or writ of mandamus to compel the appellee to declare the
dividend."66 Yet in spite of all this, the court affirmed the
judgment against the plaintiff because she had failed to state
a cause of action under the theory upon which she sued. The
66. Note (1940) 15 Ind. L. J. 575.
67. Ibid. See also 133 A.L.R. 653 (1941).
68. - Ind. App. -, 59 N.E. (2d) 907 (1945).
69. Id. at 911.
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complaint sounded in express assumpsit as for money due,
and in such cases, none is due until declared. Thus, the
court held that plaintiff should have sued in equity for a
mandatory injunction ordering the declaration of the divi-
dend, rather than suing at law for its payment. Although
the distinctions between law and equity in Indiana have been
long abolished, the court held that it could not consider the
suit in question as one in equity.70
Stock Transfers; Ultra Vires Acts.
Another case of a figurehead corporation, but one pos-
ing an altogether different series of problems from those
in the O'Neall case supra, is found in First Merchants Nation-
al Bank v. Murdock Realty Co., 71 and its companion cases.
The affairs of the corporation were under the control of A,
its president, and B, his sister who together owned a ma-
jority of the stock. They executed a corporate mortgage to
secure both a corporate obligation and certain individual
obligations. Before suit for foreclosure was begun, A, by
blank indorsement, had transferred some 400 shares formerly
owned by him to C, a third person who, as a minority stock-
holder, intervened after foreclosure proceedings to protest
against the corporation's allegedly ultra vires act in execut-
ing the mortgage. The court held that C had a right to
intervene as a minority stockholder even though no "book
transfer" of the certificates was ever made in his favor. As
previously held by the Appellate Court,72 mere delivery of
the certificates indorsed in blank is enough to transfer title
under the Act.7 3 This is true even though the stock certifi-
cate provides specifically that it is transferrable only upon
the books of the corporation.7 4 On the strength of this, the
70. This question is discussed at greater length under the Equity
material in this symposium, infra .
71. 111 Ind. App. 226, 39 N.E. (2d) 507 (1942).
72. Conrad v. Olds, 110 Ind. App. 208, 37 N.E. (2d) 297 (1941).
73. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1933) §25-701 et seq. This is the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, adopted in 40 jurisdictions. Its purpose is
to give to corporate stock a character equivalent to that of a
negotiable instrument. Under the act, a stock certificate and
the title to the shares represented by it may be transferred by
delivery of the certificate indorsed in blank, and equities in favor
of the owner may be terminated by indorsement of the certifi-
cate by the person appearing to be the owner and by its delivery
to a bona fide purchaser. Ibid.
74. Crowder v. Terhorst, 107 Ind. App. 288, 21 N.E. (2d) 141 (1939).
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Appellate Court held C, the third person, to be entitled to
intervene as a representative of the stockholders.7 5 Nor was
a request necessary on his part that the officers act for his
protection; that obviously would have been a futile gesture
since the officers were the ones whose conduct was being
questioned. The further holding of the court was that the
act of the corporation was ultra vires. It is always ultra
vires for a corporation to enter into contracts of guaranty or
suretyship not in the furtherance of its business unless given
express authority to do so. Having no express authority, the
corporation in the instant case could certainly be said to be
acting beyond the furtherance of its business in mortgaging
corporate assets to secure individual indebtedness of its of-
ficers. Nor could the plaintiff bank (mortgagee) be said
to have reasonably relied on the existence of such authority.
Another suit arising out of the same circumstance was
Crowley v. First Merchants National Bank.76 It reveals that
the defendant corporation in the Murdock case had under-
taken to guarantee payment of a mortgage debt incurred
by a third corporation, X. The suit being brought against
defendant corporation and X corporation, C, the minority
stockholder in the Murdock case, again intervened to protest
against his corporation's guaranty. Again the Appellate
Court found an ultra vires act. Moreover, the guaranty was
found to have been given without consideration since nothing
of value moved from X corporation to defendant corporation.77
To confuse the issues further, a third suit, Fardy v.
Mayerstein,78 was brought by the successor of plaintiff bank.
C, the perpetual intervener, again intervened, and again the
75. It was not then definitely known how C got possession of the
certificates, although it was thought that he had bought them
at a sale as foreclosed security for a loan he had advanced to A
and which A had failed to repay.
76. 112 Ind. App. 80, 41 N.E. (2d) 669 (1942).
77. The evidence disclosed that defendant corporation had originally
taken the land in question subject to a balance on a mortgage held
by plaintiff bank. Thereafter, X corporation was organized and
defendant corporation transferred the land to X by quitelaim
deed in return for shares of stock in X corporation taken by
A and B, the two principal officers of defendant corporation, and
a third person taking one share of qualifying stock. X corporation
then executed a renewal note and mortgage to the plaintiff bank
which defendant corporation guaranteed. The reasons for the
creation of this alter ego, as well as the other intraeacies of the
intercorporate dealings are stated in the opinion at 86.
78. - Ind. App. - , 41 N.E. (2d) 851 (1942).
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Appellate. Court held in his favor. The same case reached
the Supreme Court in 1943,79 and the manner in which C had
become a stockholder was disclosed. He had held the cer-
tificates, indorsed in blank, as a pledge to secure a loan made
by him to A, president of the corporation whose acts were
in question. Upon failure of A to repay the amount bor-
rowed, C bought the pledged stock at what he called a public
sale, such sale being conducted in his home in Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, and witnessed by himself, his brother, and an
auctioneer. In the noticeable absence of circumstances evi-
dencing good faith publicity given to the sale, the court, per
Judge Richman, held that it would have been proper for the
trial court to find that no public sale had taken place. In
pledge cases, the fiduciary relation of the parties is so close
that the pledgee cannot ordinarily buy the pledged property
unless the pledge agreement gives him that right, and then
he may only purchase at a public sale. Thus, if the sale were
private, as the court indicated it thought it was, C never ob-
tained title and therefore, never had a right to intervene as
a stockholder of the defendant corporation. Judge Richman
also pointed out that although the Stock Transfer Act8°'pro-
vides for transfer of title by indorsement of the certificates,
even though such indorsement be in blank, that provision can
only apply as to a bona fide 'purchaser for value,8' and cer-
tainly there was no bona fide purchaser involved in the pledge
and sale in question. Therefore, as between the two parties,
A and C, with no innocent third persons involved, A still
owned the stock, and C was without grounds to intervene.
Thus, the Appellate Court's holding was reversed.8 2
79. Fardy v. Mayerstein, 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E. (2d) 315 (1943).
80. See note 73 supra.
81. This point was also made by the Appellate Court in Conrad v.
Olds, cited supra, note 72.
82. Rehearing denied, 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E. (2d) 966 (1943). In
addition to the inapplicability of this part of the act as between
the parties, the act does not affect voting rights under Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1933) §25-207 (e) (2), providing that no share may
be voted at a stockholders' meeting which has been transferred
on the-corporate books within a certain number of days before
the meeting. Cf. State ex. rel. Breger v. Rusehe, 219 Ind. 559,
39 N.E. (2d) 433 (1942), where it was held that the true owner
of corporate stock could vote that stock in spite of an agreement
which he entered into calling for an irrevocable proxy in an-
other person, such person not being designated in the corporate
books as the owner. As to voting trusts, see Miller, Voting Trusts
In Indiana (1929) 4 Ind. L. J. 600.
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Upon the reversal in the Supreme Court of the Fardy
case, the plaintiff then petitioned that body for certiorari to
review the Crowley case.8 3 The Supreme Court, per Judge
Swaim, conceded that its new version of the Fardy case might
not be in harmony with the Appellate Court's decision in
the Crowley case,8 4 but nevertheless refused to consider the
latter case in an illuminating discourse on the functions and
availability of the writ of certiorari.8 5
Mismanagement.
In Curtis v. North Side Realty Co.,8 6 the charge of mis-
management was raised, along with the questions of discrim-
ination in the payment of dividends and the reissuance of
acquired stock. The defendant corporation, owner by assign-
nient of realty, took such realty subject to an option to buy,
held by the lessee, granted in the original lease. The defend-
ant corporation's articles contained a provision to the effect
that the corporation should not have the power to convey
or to encumber the realty without the consent of 90 percent
of the preferred stockholders. In 1925, and again in 1936,
without the consent of 90 percent of its preferred stockhold-
ers, the corporation entered into an agreement with the lessee
whereby the rental rate was decreased. Plaintiffs, preferred
stockholders, contended that such reductions amounted to
"encumbrances" within the articles, so that they were in-
valid because not consented to by the necessary 90 percent
of the preferred stockholders. Plaintiffs also complained
of discrimination in another part of the 1936 contract which
decreased the percentage of dividends payable to the preferred
stockholders who were parties to that agreement. They also
charged mismanagement in the reissuance of acquired shares
of preferred stock without the consent of all holders of out-
83. Cited supra note 76. The denial of certiorari is found in 221 Ind.
682, 50 N.E. (2d) 918 (1943).
84. In reversing the Fardy case, Judge Richman indicated disapproval
of the Crowley case. "If the effect of that case is contrary to
our holding herein, it is disapproved." 221 Ind. 339, 349, 47 N.E.(2d) 315, 319.
85. Certiorari is not available unless (1) the lower court acts be-
yond its jurisdiction; or (2) acts in an illegal manner; or (3)
no other mode of review is available. In the Crowley case, none
of the three was present. There was a mode of review open;
viz., petition to transfer to the Supreme Court. That petition was
denied only because it failed to comply with the Rules of Court.
86. 111 Ind. App. 81, 39 N.E. (2d) 489 (1942).
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standing preferred stock, and asked that a receiver be ap-
pointed to manage the corporate affairs.
The court held that the rent reductions did not consti-
tute encumbrances on the realty, and also that under the
corporation's articles, the unanimous consent of the stock-
holders, or even a 90 percent consent was not necessary to
validate the 1936 agreement. The charge of discrimination
in the payment of dividends could not be sustained since only
those who voluntarily consented to the 1936 agreement were
affected, and they were estopped by their own free consent.
The court also found the agreement to be supported by suf-
ficient consideration in that the lessee had deposited $3,000
with a trustee as security for the performance of its obli-
gations under the lease. This was held to be sufficient re-
turn for the rent reductions. Lastly, the court disposed of
the reissuing of acquired stock by pointing out that the
articles restricted only the reissuance of redeemed stock, and
contained no prohibition or qualification as to acquired stock.87
The case still leaves open the question of how much the rights
of the stockholders can be impaired by amendment of the
articles of incorporation under Indiana's rather liberal stat-
ute.
88
87. Subject to the articles of incorporation, the general practice in
redemption shares is to retire them upon redemption, whereas in
reacquired stock, the shares are not extinguished by the reacquisi-
tion. They may be reissued at any time, or may be held in sus-
pension. For further reading on redemption and acquisition, see
Stevens, Private Corporation (1936) 245, 383, and Ballantine,
Private Corporations (1927) 422, 427. Where preferred stock
certificates provided that the corporation agreed to redeem it at
par value plug arrearages of dividends, a guarantor who guaran-
teed payment of the dividends and retirement of the stock in
accordance with the provisions of the certificates, was bound to
redeem the stock even though the plaintiff seeking such redemption
had purchased his stock from other preferred stockholders when
the corporation was insolvent at a price less than either par or
a subsequent liquidating dividend. Curtis v. Beckett, 114 Ind.
App. 221, 50 N.E. (2d) 920 (1943). On the related problem
of increasing the outstanding capital stock by voting stock divi-
dends out of authorized but unissued stock, and also the problem
of consideration for such issuance, see Wabash Valley Coach Co.
v. Turner, 221 Ind. 52, 46 N.E. (2d) 212 (1943). See also State
ex rel. Wabash Valley Coach Co. v. Beasley, 221 Ind. 274, 47
N.E. (2d) 324, cert, den. 319 U.S. 754 (1943). As to the fee
chargeable to a foreign agricultural corporation for an increase
in its capital stock, see Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 591.
88. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§25-221 to 25-229.
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TRANSFER OF ASSETS; LIABILITY FOR ASSESS-
MENTS
The question of liability for corporate debts upon trans-
fer of assets from one corporation to another was raised in
State ex rel. Thompson v. City of Greencastle. A privately
owned water works company, in petitioning the Public Serv-
ice Commission for a rate increase some eighteen years ago,
caused the commission to incur a considerable amount of
expense. Although the commission ordered the city to re-
imburse it for these expenses, it was never done. Some years
later, a plan was evolved for the transfer of the corporate
assets and stock to the city. The stock was owned in its
totality by the officers and directors of the private corpor-
ation, and they sold it, along with the corporate assets, to
the city's agents, then resigned as directors. The interme-
diaries, or agents of the city, immediately appointed new
directors to transfer the stock and assets to the city. Thus
the original stockholders got full value for the stock and the
assets of the corporation without accounting to the state for
the claim of the Public Service Commission.
It takes no great amount of perception to see that such
a devious method of defeating the just claims of creditors
could not be allowed. Thus, the court held that the claims
could be satisfied out of the assets in the hands of the stock-
holders after the sale and tranfer, 0 then moved on to con-
sider the liability of the city, if any. It held that in sales
of assets by one corporation to another, no agreement on the
part of the vendee to assume the debts of the vendor will
be presumed, but if such agreement does in fact exist, then
the vendee assumes the vendor's liability. The court found
that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to decide that
such liability existed on the part of the vendor in the instant
case, and left the question of assumption or non-assumption
of that liability for the jury.
On the related queustion of the validity of the assessment
against the corporation by the Public Service Commission
in its rate investigation, the Attorney General had ruled in
1935 that in his opinion the statute providing for such as-
sessments8 ' was a valid one and that legitimate expenses
89. 111 Ind. App. 640, 40 N.E. (2d) 888 (1942).
90. Citing Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398 (1921).
91. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §54-425.
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incurred by the commission in its pre-regulation investiga-
tions should be paid by the utility involved.12 The court in
the instant case confirms that opinion and says that the
costs should be borne by the utility even though the enforce-
ment of the rates set up as a result of the investigation was
subsequently enjoined.9 3 The Attorney General ruled in 1939
that the expenses involved in "re-valuing" utility property
could also be charged to the utility.9 4 As to what require-
ments should be met before any expenses are chargeable to
the utility, the Attorney General in 1944 ventured that they
must be "those expenses incurred in a proceeding pending
before the commission, or in a proceeding initiated as the
result of the investigation," and the utility must be given
the opportunity to inquire as to the amount and the legality
of the expenses.9
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Fees for Admission.
Chapter 79, Acts of 19299r required every foreign fi-
nance company doing certain enumerated kinds of business
within the state to pay the Auditor of State fifty cents on
each hundred dollars gross income derived from Indiana
business. Provision was also made for revocation of au-
thority to do business in the state in case of failure to pay
the fee. While this section was not among those expressly
repealed by the Indiana General Corporation Act of 1929, 97
it was contended in State ex rel. Davenport v. International
Harvester Co.9 8 that its r~peal should be implied from both
the General Corporation Act and the Intangible Tax Act
of 1933,99 which in part set up the intangibles tax in lieu
of other taxes.100 The court, in denying these contentions,
pointed out that repeal by implication should never be fa-
92. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1935) p. 451.
93. Greencastle Water Works Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 31 F. (2d) 600(S.D. Ind. 1929).
94. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1939) p. 23.
95. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 433, 436.
96. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §25-315.
97. The prior acts expressly repealed, 89 in number, are enumerated
in §25-404.
98. 216 Ind. 463, 25 N.E. (2d) 242 (1940).
99. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-901 et seq.
100. See id. at §64-931.
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vored, particularly where the acts in conflict were passed
by the same session of the legislature, and more specifically,
that neither of the above-named acts laid any foundation for
such an implication.
Although the Corporation Act was approved and became
effective after Chapter 79, so as to become later legislation,
the bill which became Chapter 79 was passed by the General
Assembly four days after the bill for the Corporation Act,
indicating no legislative intent toward repeal of that Act
by the Corporation Act. The Intangible Tax Act, already
held to be a general excise measure,101 could not as such, be
taken to repeal Chapter 79, requiring the license fee for
foreign corporations. Therefore, the court held Chapter 79
to be both unrepealed and constitutional. However, since
the corporation in question had entered the state before
passage of the act, the court held that it could not apply
against the corporation in question since it did not apply
to domestic corporations. 10 2
Purchase of Stock in Foreign Corporations; Public Utilities.
As to whether an Indiana public utility could purchase
stock in a non-resident utility, the Attorney General ruled in
1942103 that the allowability of such a purchase would be
within the discretion of the Public Service Commission, de-
pending upon the best interests of the state, assuming of
course, that the utility's charter permitted such a purchase.
An earlier opinion'04 was substantially in accord, and provided
further, that if such a purchase were allowed, the books,
papers, and accounts of the foreign utility should be kept in
Indiana subject to the examination of the commission, and
also that a majority of the directors would have to be resi-
dents of Indiana.
101. With two dissents, the act was held to be constitutional as an
excise tax statute in Lutz, Atty. Gen. v. Arnold, 208 Ind. 480,
193 N.E. 840 (1935). See Comment (1935) 10 Ind. L. J. 450.
For a discussion of this act in its present context as a tax measure,
see Dunham, Indiana Law and Legislation, 1940-1945; Taxation
(1946) 21 Ind. L. J. 113, 122.
102. Once admitted within the state, the foreign corporation becomes
a quasi citizen, and must then be given the same treatment as
given to domestic corporations. As to fees chargeable for ad-
mission of a foreign corporation to do business in the state, see
Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1943) p. 100. As to domestic corporations,
see Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 249.
103. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1942) p. 247.
104. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1917-1920) p. 413,
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Tax on Foreign Corporations.
Presumably, State v. Prudential Life Insurance Co.0 5
has been discussed elsewhere. Briefly, the holding was that
the Indiana Insurance Premium Tax Actlo 6 was not uncon-
stitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce. It
arose as a result of the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing in United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Asso-
ciation 07 that insurance was commerce, and therefore could
be interstate commerce.
AUTHORITY OF OFFICERS
In Anthony Wayne Oil Co. v. Barall, °10 the Appellate
Court held that the fact that a person was a corporate of-
ficer, even a president, did not clothe him with authority to
such an extent that he could execute a sub-lease and bind
the corporation. This problem has been raised many times
in Indiana,109 and the cases are in accord in holding that in
the absence of actual authority, there must be some foun-
dation for finding apparent authority other than in the mere
fact that the person purporting to act for the corporation is
one of its officers.
CORPORATIONS PRACTICING LAW
Not of much importance as a matter of substantive law,
but of interest to the profession is the case of Groninger v.
Fletcher Trust Co.11o Defendant trust company, authorized
by law to act as executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee,
had in its employ three full time attorneys to handle matters
connected with the establishment and execution of trusts.
The attorneys did not in any other way practice their pro-
fession. In a class action brought for the benefit of all
practicing attorneys, plaintiffs sought to enjoin these ac-
tivities, which they said constituted an illegal practice of
the law. The Indiana State Bar Association filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of that position.
105. - Ind. - , 64 N.E. (2d) 150 (1945).
106. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1940 Replacement) §39-4802.
107. 322 U.S. 533 (1944), reversing Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168
(U.S., 1868).
108. 111 Ind. App. 670, 42 N.E. (2d) 370 (1942).
109. See cases cited in the opinion at 675.
110. 220 Ind. 202, 41 N.E. (2d) 140 (1942).
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The court held for the defendant, saying that a corpor-
ation has every right to act in its own affairs as a natural
person has, except that the natural person can act in ropria
persona, while the corporation must act through some na-
tural person or persons. Since the natural person can exe-
cute trusts without illegally practicing law, so can the cor-
poration.11'
LEGISLATION
General Corporation Act
Domestic Corporations for Profit; Acceptance of 1929 Act.
The amendments made in 1941 to the general act in this
regard have been discussed elsewhere at greater length.112
§46 of the original Act".3 provided that any corporation ex-
isting at the time of the passage of the 1929 Act might "re-
organize" so as to come within the provisions of the new act.
The use of the word "reorganized" was unfortunate since
in its technical sense that word applies to a judicial sale of
corporate property and franchises and the formation of a
new corporation by the purchaser. 1" Thus all forms of the
word throughout the act were replaced in 1941 by the words
"accept," "accepted," "acceptance," "articles of acceptance,"
etc.",; This substitution seemed necessary for clarity since
compliance with the 1929 act required none of the acts char-
acteristic of a true reorganization. The 1941 amendment16
gave the same right to "accept" the provisions of the act to
corporations which had come into existence prior to March
16, 1929, and whose corporate existence had terminated, by
filing articles of acceptance within five years after termina-
tion. Upon doing so, the corporation was to be treated as
though its existence had been continuous. The amendment
was declared not to apply to corporations which had forfeited
111. Other similar cases are cited in the opinion at.208. For further
treatment of the same problem, see 151 A.L.R. 782 (1944), 157
A.L.R. 283 (1945).
112. Indiana Legislation (1941) 17 Ind. L. J. 129, 145.
113. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §25-245.
114. Ballantine, Law Dictionary (1930) 1118.
115. The sections where the substitutions were made were as follows:
id. at §§25-230, 25-245, 25-246, 25-247, 25-248, and 25-249.
116. Ind. Acts 1941, c. 226, §, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943),§25-245.
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their charters however. In 1943, another amendment was
made which increased the time of grace from five years to
ten.117
The Attorney General ruled in 1941,118 that any corpor-
ation wishing to accept the act must include in its corporate
name the words "corporation" or "incorporated," or some
abbreviation of one of them. However, in 1944, the Attor-
ney General reversed that opinion and held that the name
of the previously incorporated company would be sufficient
even though it did not contain such words or their abbreva-
tions. 119
Shareholders' Meetings.
In 1943, the time at which the annual meeting of cor-
porate shareholders should be held was increased from four
to five months after the close of the fiscal year.2 0
Foreign Corporations; Service of Summons.
A 1941 amendment 2' added another paragraph to the
section of the act providing for resident agents of foreign
corporations doing business for profit within the state.1 22
The substance of the addition was that the resident agent
could terminate his agency at any time he saw fit by filing
with the Secretary of State a statement of his unwillingness
to serve further. However, such act of disaffirmance does
not relieve the corporation from service of process, since it
is provided at another place that service may be made on the
Secretary of State if the corporation fails to appoint an agent
in the first place.12 3 Presumably that provision would ap-
ply equally well where a resident agent has terminated his
agency and the corporation has not yet appointed a successor.
A 1945 act" 4 provides that a corporation authorized to do
117. Ind. Acts 1943, c. 94, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943)
§25-245.
118. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1941) p. 293.
119. Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1944) p. 287. This opinion restates an
earlier opinion to the same effect in Ops. Ind. Atty. Gen. (1929)
p. 89.
120. Ind. Acts 1943, c. 66, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943)
§25-207 (k). This was the amendment to Ind. Acts 1929; c. 215,
§8.
121. Ind. Acts 1941, c. 226, §8.
122. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §25-306.
123. Id. at §25-313.
124. Ind. Acts 1945, c- 72.
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business in Indiana may be appointed as the resident agent
of any corporation, resident or non-resident, for profit or
not for profit. The act further provides that service of legal
process may be made on such a resident agent by service on
the president, a vice-president, the secretary, or an assistant
secretary of the corporate resident agent.
Another 1945 act 1 25 provides that in all actions against
or by a corporation incorporated under Indiana law, where
it is proper or necessary to have a non-resident director of
the corporation as a party, service of summons on the di-
rector may be made by service on the resident agent of the cor-
poration. The act further provides that any non-resident who
accepts a directorship in an Indiana corporation is deemed to
have appointed the resident agent of the corporation as his
own agent for purposes of service.
Forfeiture of Articles.
The requirements of the 1933 act relative to forfeiture
of articles of corporations for profit failing to file annual
reports'12 6 have been superseded by legislation in 1943,1^7
which makes a distinction between corporations organized
prior to the effective date of the 1943 statutes and those
organized after that time. The same is true of the similar
provisions for corporations not for profit.'
27
125. Ind. Acts 1945, c. 361.
126. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§25-407 to 25-409.
127. Ind. Acts 1943, c. 146, §§1-7, c. 147, §§1-8, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
Supp. 1943) §§25-410 to 25-423.
128. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Sup. 1943) §25-536, superceded by Ind.
Acts 1943, cited supra note 127.
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